DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Special Historical Edition
DIA 50th Anniversary

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29 SEPTEMBER 2011

1961 · 2011
CELEBRATING OUR LEGACY
FORGING OUR FUTURE

COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE IN DEFENSE OF THE NATION

"I would stress to the intelligence officer that…their knowledge of history is absolutely essential if they are going to do anything in the intelligence business that is worthwhile."

LTG EUGENE F. TIGHE JR., USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
September 1977–August 1981

On 1 October, we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

SINCE 1961, DIA contributions have been instrumental in shaping significant events in U.S. history. To recognize this important milestone and to inspire reflection on 50 years of DIA's commitment to excellence in defense of the nation, the DIA Historical Research Support Branch, in collaboration with the Directorate for Analysis, has prepared this special edition of the Defense Intelligence Digest.

In compiling this special edition, we selected a significant historical event from each of the five decades and asked our historians to prepare an article to provide background and context, to discuss DIA's unique defense intelligence contributions, and to examine the historical significance of these contributions. With each article, we also present examples of the original intelligence products our predecessors provided to DIA customers. We prepared this special edition to highlight the broad range of challenges faced by DIA's intelligence professionals throughout the Agency's history and to demonstrate the degree to which many of these challenges continue to resonate with today's generation of intelligence professionals.

The selection of articles for this special edition is necessarily arbitrary and should not detract from an appreciation of the Agency's contribution to other historical events that have shaped our nation's history. From the Cold War to the Gulf War, from the conflict in Vietnam to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, from confronting communism to battling terrorism, the dedicated professionals of DIA have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to excellence in defense of the nation. The coming decades will present the Agency and the nation with a complex array of national security challenges and opportunities. One of the best ways to prepare for this future is to understand our past.

LTG RONALD L. BURGESS, JR. USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

29 September 2011

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(U) The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

(U) **Background.** In May 1962, Nikita Khruschev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, secured agreement from the Soviet Presidium to place nuclear-equipped medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba. His goal was to counter what he believed to be U.S. nuclear superiority and to protect his ally Fidel Castro from U.S. attempts to remove him from power. The Soviets code-named the operation ANADYR, after the river in far-northeast Siberia. The plan called for a large combined-arms force of motorized infantry, tanks, tactical aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), coastal defense vessels, light bombers, and five missile regiments composed of SS-4 Sandal MRBMs and SS-5 Skean intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

(U) By the end of August, most of this force was in place. MRBMs and IRBMs began arriving on 15 September, and Soviet engineers in Cuba began hastily assembling the missile sites. Owing to the presence of SA-2 SAMs, the United States halted U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba between September and early October. As evidence of a major Soviet deployment increased, however, the Kennedy administration relented and allowed a single flight on 14 October, which discovered the presence of the strategic missiles. Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba, and for 13 days the world sat on the brink of nuclear war. Finally, after a series of back-channel negotiations, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missiles and remove them from Cuba. In exchange, the United States secretly agreed that it would not move to depose Castro and would remove its nuclear-equipped Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

(U) **The DIA Effort.** DIA was not yet even a year old when the Soviets began deploying missiles to Cuba, and its intelligence production capabilities were limited to current intelligence, warning, and estimates. Nonetheless, the agency was quick to recognize the seriousness of the buildup. On 3 October, almost 2 weeks before the United States discovered the Soviet strategic missiles, Lt Gen Joseph Carroll, DIA's director, set up a special Cuban Situation Room to monitor events around the clock. The room was staffed by analysts from current intelligence and estimates functions. Using photographs taken by high- and low-altitude reconnaissance missions, as well as HUMINT reports from debriefings of Cuban refugees,

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

Source: DID Graphics

(U) The relative ranges of the IL-28/Beagle, SS-4/Sandal, and SS-5/Skean.

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SUPPLEMENT

THE OFFENSIVE THREAT IN CUBA

Significance:

A significant deployment of guided missiles to Cuba is already well advanced and has proceeded by first deploying a large force of defensive weapons, followed quickly by long-range offensive guided missiles and aircraft. A mixed force of 1,000 and 2,200-nm ballistic missiles in Cuba provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the US and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the actual deployment itself began last spring.

Offensive Deployment:

The equipment for 1,000-nm ballistic missiles is now being deployed in western Cuba at four launch sites near San Cristobal. Two of these are now operational, and the other two are proceeding to this status on an accelerated basis. The missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Each of the four sites contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, check-out, and support equipment. This implies a refire capability from each unit.

Other 1,000-nm ballistic missiles are deployed at two sites nine miles apart, east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area. These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch positions at each site, and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1,000-nm missile system.

23 Oct 62 DIA Intelligence Summary Page (1)

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) Extract from DIA Intelligence Summary 249-62, 23 October, 1962.

analysts working in the Cuban Situation Room produced daily, and occasionally twice-daily, current intelligence updates on the crisis.

(U) DIA Intelligence Summary 249-62, published on 23 October 1962, was produced by these analysts. DIA Intelligence Summaries were current intelligence summaries intended for broad distribution to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders in chief (CINCs) of U.S. military forces around the world. Published as the crisis was nearing its climax, this summary laid out in a special supplement the nature of the offensive threat presented by the Soviet deployment. “A mixed force of 1,000 and 2,200

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Two fixed sites for 2,200-nm ballistic missiles are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. One site is considered to be in a mid-to-late stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. The other site is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December. No missiles or support equipment has been observed within the Guanajay area to date.

An additional fixed site has been observed at Remedios in eastern Cuba which is similar to those at Guanajay. This is probably a valid indicator of deployment of a second grouping of 2,200-nm ballistic missiles.

In addition to missiles, IL-28 light bomber aircraft with a combat radius of about 750 miles are also arriving in Cuba. Approximately 22 of these bombers, most still in crates, have been observed. These are in addition to the force of about 40 MIG-21 fighters there.

Nuclear Warheads:

A nuclear warhead storage site is believed under construction adjacent to the more complete of the fixed-missile launch sites near Guanajay. Construction is proceeding at a high rate. This site could become operational in about six weeks.

A curved-roof building similar to that at the Guanajay Site but only about 35 by 65 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.

Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which may be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at two of the San Cristobal Sites and at one Sagua La Grande Site. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.

Observation of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.

23 Oct 62 DIA Intelligence Summary Page (2)

7980

Source: DoD Archive

(U) Extract from DIA Intelligence Summary 249-62, 23 October, 1962.

(nautical mile range) ballistic missiles in Cuba," its authors wrote, "provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against nearly all targets in the U.S. and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America."

(U) The Intelligence Summary's authors, however, could not prove definitively that nuclear warheads were in Cuba. Although they noted the construction of nuclear storage facilities, none of the facilities were complete. "Nevertheless," they concluded, "one must assume that

nuclear weapons may now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available." Their assumption was both logical and accurate. In fact, the Soviets began moving nuclear warheads into Cuba through the port of Mariel on 4 October.

(U) Sometimes overlooked in subsequent histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the presence of Soviet Il-28 Beagle bombers, which was considered an offensive weapon by DIA analysts. This Intelligence Summary noted that at least 22 were in Cuba but did not draw out the full implications of their deployment because DIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community were focused on the primary offensive threat posed by the missiles. This Intelligence Summary did not raise the possibility of the IL-28s being equipped with nuclear bombs. Indeed, the 4 October Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons included six 12-kiloton tactical nuclear weapons for the bombers.

(U) **Historical Significance.** U.S. intelligence performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis presents a series of important intelligence lessons learned. It was on one hand a tactical intelligence victory; the unmasking of an extraordinarily secret and dangerous Soviet military deployment before offensive weapons could become operational was a major victory. On the other hand, the failure to anticipate Khrushchev's gambit, given the international climate and fears over Cuba on both sides, was a strategic failure. The Soviets had never before deployed nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union, and analysts throughout the Intelligence Community were too reliant on historical precedent as a predictor of Soviet behavior. They failed to account for the possibility of anomalous behavior and were thus surprised when they did discover offensive strategic weapons in Cuba.

(U) Analysts, while concerned about the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons, failed to account for the possibility that the Soviets might deploy tactical nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Intelligence analysts raise the question of tactical nuclear weapons, and no collection requirements were specifically issued that focused on such weapons. But on the 4 October delivery alone, in addition to the 40 1-megaton warheads for the SS-4s, 12 2-kiloton warheads for tactical rockets and 36 12-kiloton warheads for cruise missiles arrived in Cuba. This intelligence became known some 30 years after the crisis. Thus, while the Cuban Missile Crisis was an event unique in history, its analytical intelligence lessons—the importance of recognizing the potential for anomalies and of continuously challenging analytical assumptions—resonate even today. D

DIA/DA, Historical Research Support Branch

(U) The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, December 1979

(U) **Background.** On 27 April 1978, communist officers aligned with the Moscow-supported People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) launched a military coup that overthrew the government of Afghan President Mohammad Daoud Khan. Following a brief internal power struggle, one faction within the PDPA, the Khalq, assumed leadership of the new government and immediately tried to implement a number of Marxist-inspired reforms. These efforts failed to account for the complexities of Afghan society and generated widespread anger and discontent. Popular resistance to the Khalq regime continued to grow throughout the summer and fall of 1978. Soviet officials viewed these developments with growing alarm. They were concerned about the security of their southern border, worried that the United States would take advantage of the unsettled situation to establish "an imperialist bridgehead," and troubled by the geopolitical implications of a counterrevolution that succeeded in toppling a communist regime. In early December 1979, the Soviets decided on military intervention.

(U) In late November, elements of a Soviet airborne division began arriving at Bagram Airbase. Two weeks later, they were joined by an armored unit. Units in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts were brought up to strength through the recall of reservists and moved to the Afghan frontier. Late on 24 December, additional airborne elements began arriving at Kabul Airport, with other troops flying to Bagram, to a base near Herat, and to Kandahar. On 27 December, Soviet forces occupied key locations in Kabul, including the main ministries, and assaulted and captured the presidential palace that night. These forces were soon followed by two more divisions. Within a few days, 50,000 troops and 1,000 armored vehicles had occupied the country. Within a few weeks, the strength of the invasion force was about 85,000.

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

(U) Soviet Invasion Routes and Soviet-Controlled Territory.

Source: DoD Archive

(U) **The DIA Effort.** On 31 December, just days after the Soviet invasion, a DIA analyst published a Defense Intelligence Note (DIN) on the recent events, commenting on the "unprecedented deployment of Soviet combat forces to a country outside the Warsaw Pact" (excluding Cuba). The document correctly identifies Islamic fervor, rugged terrain, the availability of weapons, and "Afghan xenophobia" as factors militating against a quick resolution of the problem and makes the prescient observation that "the possibility of the

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DIADIN 365-5A
AS OF 2208 EST
31 DEC 79

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET COMMENTARY. (U)

MOSCOW'S FIRST OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN APPEARED IN A PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON 31 DECEMBER. THE "LIMITED MILITARY CONTINGENT" IS ALLEGEDLY IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE REQUEST OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT -- THE NEW SOVIET PUPPET REGIME HEADED BY BABRAK KARMAL. THE SOVIETS SUPPOSEDLY ARE ASSISTING IN "REPELLING AGGRESSION" AND "RESTORING PEACE" IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS, AND COOPERATION. UNDER THE EUPHEMISM OF "INTERNATIONALIST HELP," SOVIET INTERVENTION IS BEING CONDONED BY MOST EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

THIS UNPRECEDENTED DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES TO A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT -- EXCLUDING THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA -- CLEARLY REFLECTS MOSCOW'S INTENTION TO KEEP A SOCIALIST-ORIENTED REGIME IN POWER IN AFGHANISTAN. BABRAK KARMAL, WHO WAS FORMERLY LIVING IN EXILE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET MANIPULATION THAN HIS PREDECESSORS. HIS REPUTATION AS AN EXTREME MARXIST, HIS INSTALLATION BY SOVIET TROOPS, AND HIS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE USSR ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE OPPOSITION TO THE MARXIST AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. DESPITE THE BID FOR MILITARY ALLEGIANCE, AS INDICATED BY THE INCLUSION OF FORMERLY PURGED MILITARY MEMBERS IN THE CABINET, REPORTS OF THE SOVIETS KILLING OR CAPTURING AFGHAN TROOPS MAY RESULT IN MORE WIDESPREAD MILITARY DISSIDENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

ISLAMIC FERVOR, THE RUGGED TERRAIN, THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS TO THE INSURGENTS, AND AFGHAN XENOPHOBIA ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO A QUICK SOVIET RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USSR BEING DRAWN INTO A VIETNAM-TYPE QUAGMIRE CANNOT BE DISMISSED. THE NEW REGIME'S LACK OF A SOLID POWER BASE AND BABRAK'S ACCEPTABILITY TO THE KHALQ FACTION, THE MILITARY, AND THE POPULACE INDICATE A LARGE AND LONG-TERM SOVIET PRESENCE. SOVIET TROOPS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE WITHDRAWN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND IF NECESSARY, MORE SOVIET COMBAT FORCES COULD BE EMPLOYED. IF THIS CURRENT OPERATION IS SUCCESSFUL, IT WILL SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN OTHER THIRD-WORLD, SOCIALIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES. (REVW 31 DEC 85)

Declassified by SIO/IDO DAN/DIA on 8 Aug 11

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) **DIA Defense Intelligence Note 365-5A, 31 December 1979.** The DIN correctly identifies Islamic fervor, rugged terrain, the availability of weapons, and "Afghan xenophobia" as factors militating against a quick resolution of the problem and makes the prescient observation that "the possibility of the USSR being drawn into a Vietnam-type quagmire cannot be dismissed."

USSR being drawn into a Vietnam-type quagmire cannot be dismissed." The author concludes that "Soviet troops are not likely to be withdrawn in the near future, and if necessary, more Soviet combat forces could be employed."

(U) The DIN's author was a member of an intelligence task force formed under the J-2 in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. That task force included analysts from the newly established Assistant Directorate for Joint Chiefs of Staff Support, the Directorate for Research, and the Directorate for Estimates. Working in 12-hour shifts, the task force responded to a flood of requests for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commands around the globe. This DIN was one of the task force's first attempts to address the larger implications of the invasion and is an example of current intelligence reporting that does more than simply describe events. It uses the full cultural, political, geographic, and historical context to make an informed, convincing, and, as we now know, quite accurate judgment.

(U) In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the most pressing worry among defense planners, foreign policy specialists, and DIA analysts concerned the strategic implications of the Soviet invasion. Would the Soviet Army, once it secured Afghanistan, march south through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean in order to seize a long-sought-after warm-water port, or would it turn west to threaten the oilfields of Iran? Initially, there was little unanimity within DIA regarding Soviet intentions. A DIN prepared by the task force in mid-January 1980 suggested Soviet military action from Afghanistan into Iran was unlikely, since the largest Iranian oilfields were separated from the Afghan border by more than 1,000 miles and 2 mountain ranges. Other analysts, however, feared that the invasion portended a major Soviet effort to remake the political geography of the Middle East and Central Asia with the ultimate goal of controlling the oil resources and infrastructure in the region as a means to pressure the West. By February, these concerns had receded, and the analytic consensus that eventually emerged within DIA was that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan neither increased nor decreased the Soviet threat to the Middle East. DIA analysts also concluded that a Soviet move into Pakistan to secure a warm-water port was unlikely given the daunting logistic challenges associated with such an undertaking.

(U) For the next decade, DIA analysts tracked Soviet force structure and capabilities and monitored the expanding insurgency against the government in Kabul. Following the signing of the Geneva Accords, DIA personnel monitored the months-long withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

(U) **Historical Significance.** The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a watershed event in the Cold War. Its legacy is seen in many of the issues that shape today's national security environment. The experience in Afghanistan weakened the Soviet Union militarily, economically, and politically, directly contributing to the collapse that ended the Cold War and dramatically altering the geopolitical landscape. The conflict attracted Islamic fighters from around the globe, producing a new generation of global jihadists who were

experienced, internationally networked, and emboldened by their success against the Soviet superpower. Finally, the conflict left Afghanistan in turmoil, setting the stage for a long period of instability and civil war that led to the rise of the Taliban, a development of great historical significance for the region, for the United States, and for the world.

DIA/DA, Historical Research Support Branch

(U) Soviet Missile Force Projections, 1985

(U) **Background.** By 1985, after three decades of effort, the Soviet Union had amassed an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons that rivaled and, in some respects, surpassed that of the United States. The growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal and the threat it presented to the West made the question of Soviet military capabilities and intentions one of the most important issues of the Cold War. Military planners and policymakers at many levels in the DoD had long needed specific knowledge of Soviet research and development, production, and deployment of these weapons so they could structure U.S. forces to meet the threat, develop doctrine to defeat a Soviet attack, and attempt to limit their potential for damage. Since DIA's inception, the Agency had been at the center of debates over these questions.

(U) This issue came to a head in the late 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s, as the Soviets embarked on a large-scale ballistic missile modernization effort to match the new U.S. modernization program. Soviet development of advanced fourth- and fifth-generation ballistic missiles which were highly accurate and capable of carrying between 1 and 10 independently targeted re-entry vehicles was a major threat to Western security.

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) An SS-18 Mod 5 is loaded into its silo.

(U) **The DIA Effort.** The DIA study, "Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections–USSR," dated 3 June 1985, was part of the Agency's efforts to understand Soviet ballistic missile development, one of the most important analytical issues facing the agency at that point. By 1985, DIA had developed a strong managerial and cooperative relationship with Service intelligence organizations, such as the U.S. Air Force Foreign Technology Division (FTD, which would become the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, or NASIC, in 2003). As it did with many scientific and technological projects related to Soviet strategic missile technology, DIA tasked FTD with projects such as this one, and analysts in DIA's Deputy Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DT) worked closely with them on the effort.

(U) The pages presented here are the summary of the much larger 52-page study of projected Soviet strategic ballistic missile development over the next 20 years. The study presents an assessment of Soviet ballistic missile system development trends, subsystem technologies, and potential systems that its authors projected might be developed within the period of study. It was intended to fulfill the requirements of estimators, planners, and system designers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the various military departments. It was, therefore, an

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DST-1000S-267-85
3 June 1985

SUMMARY

The Soviets are continuing to pursue improvements to their currently deployed strategic ballistic missile systems. Expansion and modification of research institutes, design bureaus, rocket propulsion test stands, launch sites, and production facilities have continued beyond the time frames applicable to currently deployed systems. These investments indicate that new or modified ballistic missiles will be flight-tested in the near term

echnologies in key areas such as materials, computers, guidance components, reentry vehicles, and propulsion are being pushed, and the expected advancements will allow significant accuracy and payload improvements, and increased flexibility in basing modes.

Background (U)

The Soviets have been developing strategic ballistic missile systems for over three decades. They are known to have flight-tested 14 ICBMs, 3 IRBMs, 3 MRBMs, and 9 SLBMs. Of these, two ICBM development programs (SS-X-10 and SS-X-15), one MRBM program (SS-14), and one SLBM program (SS-NX-13) were canceled prior to deployment. Four ICBMs, one SLBM, one IRBM and one MRBM have been removed from the operational force. Two ICBMs, the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25; one IRBM, the and one SLBM, the SS-NX-23 are in the flight-test stage of development. Numerous modifications to existing systems have also been flight-tested. Modification of existing systems allows improvement of subsystems as technology becomes available. This trend of incremental modification is only slightly altered when a sufficiently improved technology or changed mission requirement moves Soviet planners to start a new missile program.

These accomplishments are possible because of the large investments in design, development, test, and production complexes. Four design bureaus act as prime contractors for missile system developments. These major design bureaus are under defense industrial ministries that are ultimately responsible to the Politburo through the Military Industrial Commission (VPK). These bureaus are in turn supported by numerous research institutes and support design bureaus responsible for technology, component, and subsystem developments.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Soviets dedicated their resources to developing a strategic nuclear missile force that has been superior in numbers and throw weight to the US strategic missile force since the early 1970's. Since that time, and continuing through the present, the Soviets have not relinquished this superiority nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future. The Soviet's intense desire to maintain superiority over the US in strategic ballistic missiles has provided the momentum that has allowed them to develop technically sophisticated, more effective ballistic missile systems. This trend is expected to continue.

Forecast (U)

The projections presented are the "most likely" new ballistic missiles the Soviets are expected to develop and flight test over the next 20 years. These projections are based on observed intelligence indicators, perceived Soviet mission requirements, technology, and trend analysis. Generally, systems projected in the near term, which are based on observed intelligence indicators, have a higher level of confidence than projections for subsequent time periods that are based on perceived mission requirements, technology, and trend analysis. The further into the future a projection is made, of course, the less confidence there is with the projection. Technology and trend analysis are used to derive system performance parameters for projected systems. Evaluation of factors such as force-mix philosophy, internal politics, and economics is beyond the scope of this study, but their impact certainly may influence future weapon developments.

There are indicators the Soviets are preparing to flight test at least three new strategic ballistic missile systems in the near term—a large solid ICBM, an SS-18 Follow-On, and an SS-X-[illegible] Follow-On.

a Follow-On to the SS-20, is expected to be road mobile. A Mod to the SS-X-24 is also expected in this time frame.

The new large solid is expected to be about the same size as the SS-19 with a gross weight of up to 135,000 kg and throw weight of up to 4,000 kg.

Until recently, there have been no firm indicators of new liquid-propellant, strategic ballistic

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missile development in the Soviet Union. However, beginning in the Spring of 1983, a series of possibly related events at ballistic missile R&D facilities could be an indication that the Soviets may flight test an SS-18 Follow-On by the late 1980's. This new system is expected to have an improved PBV and RVs and increased accuracy and throw weight. Table I outlines the characteristics of systems projected for first flight in the near term.

In the far term, both new solid and liquid systems are projected. In the early-to-mid 1990's, a new solid-propellant ICBM is expected to replace the SS-X-24. Mods to the projected large solid ICBM, SS-18 Follow-On and SS-X-25 Follow-On could also emerge during the early to mid-1990's. During the mid-to-late 1990's, replacement for the projected large solid ICBM and the are anticipated. Shortly after the turn of the century, a new liquid-propellant ICBM could replace the SS-18 Follow-On projected for first-flight in the late 1980's. (See Table II.)

TABLE I

(U) PROJECTED NEAR-TERM LAND-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

PROJECTED SYSTEM	FIRST FLIGHT (yr)	THROW WEIGHT[1] (kg)	CEP[2] (m)	NUMBER OF RVs/ RV WEIGHT (kg)
Modified SS-X-24	1986-1988	2,400	260	1/1,400; 10/140
SS-18 Follow-On	1988	9,600	155	1/6000; 14/430; 24/250
SS-X-25 Follow-On	1988	1,200	260	1/720; 3/240
Large Solid ICBM	1988	4,000	155	1/2600; 10/250

[1]ICBM range—10,000 km
IRBM range—3,000 km.
[2]CEPs are given for a fixed (silo) basing mode.
CEP for mobile systems could be degraded by 5 to 30 percent depending on the mobile basing concept.

TABLE II

(U) PROJECTED FAR-TERM LAND-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

PROJECTED SYSTEM	FIRST FLIGHT (yr)	THROW WEIGHT[1] (kg)	CEP[2] (m)	NUMBER OF RVs/ RV WEIGHT (kg)
SS-X-24 Follow-On	Early-mid 1990's	3,800	150-230	10/250
Modified SS-X-25 Follow-On	Early-mid 1990's	1,200	150-230	1/720 3/240
Modified Large Solid ICBM	Early-mid 1990's	4,000	125 50-100	10/240 8/300 (MARV)
Modified SS-18 Follow-On	Early 1990's	9,600	125 50-100	24/250 20/300 (MARV)
Large Solid ICBM Follow-On	Late 1990's	6,000	125 50-100	15/250 12/300 (MARV)
Solid IRBM Follow-On)	Mid-1990's	2,000	100-150	4/325
Large Liquid ICBM	Early 2000's	10,000	120 50	30/200 24/250 (MARV)

[1]ICBM range—10,000 km
IRBM range—5,000 km.
[2]CEP for mobile systems could be degraded by 5 to 30 percent.

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In the area of naval ballistic missiles, the Soviets are currently testing the SS-NX-23. The SS-NX-23 is a three-stage, liquid-propellant MIRV follow-on to the SS-N-18 and is expected to be deployed on DELTA IV and possibly also modified DELTA III Class SSBNs begining in 1986.

The Soviets could flight test at least three additional SLBM systems during the next 20 years. (See Table III.) One of these systems is expected to be an SS-N-20 Follow-On, which would be deployed in modified TYPHOON SSBNs during the late 1980's. An improved version of the SS-NX-23 is estimated to be in development and be deployed in a new class SSBN by the early 1990's. One other SLBM may be tested and deployed in the 1990's, possibly in a new class SSBN. The goal of these developments is to obtain significant accuracy improvements over currently deployed SLBMs, as well as increases in throw weight. Minor system improvements to the SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-17, and SS-N-18 can also be expected if these missiles continue to be deployed. Soviet SLBM systems projected for the late 1980's and 1990's include an option for at least a mid-course, and possibly also terminal-aided guidance systems that would be accurate enough for a hard-target role. Equally important, improvements to weapon system reliability with optimal payload fractionation/yield would be expected if hard-target destruction is to be a primary mission for these SLBM systems. The number of RVs per SLBM is expected to increase during the late 1990's.

TABLE III

(U) PROJECTED SLBM SYSTEMS

PROJECTED SYSTEM	FIRST FLIGHT (yr)	THROW WEIGHT (kg)	RANGE (km)	CEP (m)
SS-N-20 Follow-On	1985-1986	2,600	9,000	400[1]
SS-NX-23 Follow-On	1987-1988	2,600	8,000-9,000	400[1]
New SLBM Class	1990-1993			

[1]With external guidance update during PBV burn or free-flight, 200 m. With update during reentry, 50-100 m (early 1990's).

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(U) Extracts from "Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections – USSR", 3 June 1985.

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extraordinarily wide-ranging study that influenced the work of many key policymaking and warfighting institutions.

(U) The study opened with a prescient caveat. It noted that "Evaluation of factors such as force-mix philosophy, internal politics, and economics is beyond the scope of this study, but their impact certainly may influence future weapon developments." All three factors noted would later undergo significant change as Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to overhaul the Soviet economy, which was heavily dependent on military outlays. Under Gorbachev, the use of strategic weapons for national defense received heavy emphasis and the modernization program continued, while conventional forces saw major cuts. The dislocations resulting from the rapid demobilization of large numbers of troops and the cancellation of many conventional weapons programs contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(U) The accuracy of the study's technical projections was mixed, but nonetheless impressive, given the difficulty of the task. For example, the study predicted that a follow-on to the SS-18 Satan heavy ICBM would begin testing in 1988. No follow-on to the SS-18 actually materialized, but the SS-18 Mods 5 and 6 were deployed in 1988 (they are currently operational, and according to open-source reporting, will remain so until 2016-2020.) The forecast for the testing and development of a modified, experimental SS-24 Scalpel, however, was exceptional. The modified SS-24, known by the Soviets as the Molodets system, could be silo-, rail-, and road-based, as opposed to the solely rail-based version of the original. Flight tests, as analysts predicted, began in April 1986 and were complete in November 1988. The SS-24 was in service for 17 years. According to open-source reporting, the last SS-24 was removed from operational status in August 2005.

(U) **Historical Significance.** This study was significant for several reasons. In March 1985, 3 months before the study's publication (and 3 months after the study's information cutoff date), Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party and de facto Soviet head of state. Gorbachev publicly proclaimed his intention to restructure the Soviet economy, a policy known as *Perestroika* ("re-structuring"), and intended to do so in part by drastically reducing military expenditures. "Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections" helped provide policymakers with a baseline understanding of Soviet strategic missile development and deployment. Moreover, U.S. President Ronald Reagan would meet with Gorbachev at a summit in Geneva in November 1985, and he would do so armed with the knowledge that despite Gorbachev's claims to be reducing military expenditures, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces were modernizing and expanding as quickly as ever. Soviet strategic force modernization would continue even as the Soviet Union itself began its terminal decline in the late 1980s.

(U) The study also highlights the increased authority over and cooperation with other organizations that DIA had achieved by 1985. Since its establishment in 1961, the Agency had struggled to coordinate and manage national-level military intelligence production.

Most other military intelligence organizations operated largely independent of Agency guidance. A long series of changes beginning in the 1970s slowly addressed these shortcomings, and by 1985, the Agency had clear lines of authority and better managerial procedures to coordinate key aspects of intelligence production for national and command-level consumers. D

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(U) The Siege of Sarajevo, 1992-1996

(U) **Background.** The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, created in 1946, consisted of six republics and two autonomous areas. For most of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was ruled by Communist leader Josip Broz (Tito), a dictator who managed to control and suppress the tensions resulting from the country's multiethnic composition. After his death in 1980, strong ethnic and nationalist currents reemerged to threaten the unity of the country and, by the end of 1990, it was clear the end for Yugoslavia was near. National Intelligence Estimate 15-90, published in October 1990, noted that "Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two."

(U) In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, fighting a short war against the remnants of the Serbian-led Yugoslav National Army. After a referendum that was boycotted by its Serbian population, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on 3 March 1992. In response, Bosnian Serbs established the Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina and, with direct support from Serbia, began a genocidal war against the Muslim Bosniak and Croat populations in order to secure the territory of their new republic. As part of their campaign, the Bosnian Serbs laid siege to the city of Sarajevo on 5 April 1992. On 6 April, European Community countries recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the United States followed on 7 April. Both began supplying humanitarian aid to Bosnia immediately.

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Source: Mikhail Evstafiev

(U) The Bosnian Parliament building burns after being hit by Serbian tank fire, 1992. This building was only 250 meters south of the American Center in Sarajevo.

(U) **The DIA Effort.** Between 17 and 19 April, in the earliest days of the siege of Sarajevo, USDAO Belgrade members traveled to Sarajevo. Their mission was to coordinate the delivery of U.S. relief supplies scheduled to arrive on 18 April, to assess security at the airport for the arrival of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ralph Johnson, and to report on conditions inside the city itself. For 3 days, they extensively toured the airfield, the city center, and old Sarajevo. The dispatches sent back to DIA after this trip provided a reliable, firsthand account of conditions in the embattled capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(U) One of these dispatches, dated 20 April 1992, provides a snapshot of the Bosnian government's collapsing ability to maintain public order. The report documents random acts of violence between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks within the capital and evidence of sniper, mortar, and artillery fire landing in the city. Gunfire could be heard in the distance each night,

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SUMMARY: (U) . . . USDAO BELGRADE'S OBSERVATIONS AFTER THREE DAYS IN SARAJEVO. SITUATION IS TENSE, FOOD SUPPLIES ARE ALMOST NONEXISTENT, AND THE PROBLEMS THERE MAY ONLY GET WORSE.

1. (U) RO'S WERE ON THE GROUND IN THE CITY OF SARAJEVO FROM 1230 LOCAL (L) ON 17 APRIL 1992 UNTIL 1850L 19 APRIL 1992. RO'S TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY BETWEEN THE SARAJEVO/ILIDZA CIVILIAN AIRFIELD (AFLD) AND THE AMERICAN CENTER IN THE CITY CENTER.

3. (U) THE AMERICAN CENTER IS APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED METERS NORTH OF THE HOLIDAY INN HOTEL, 250 METERS NORTH OF THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (B-H) ASSEMBLY BUILDING.

4. (U) RO'S SPENT THE NIGHT OF 17/18 APRIL IN THE AMERICAN CENTER DIRECTOR'S OFFICE FOR SECURITY REASONS . . .. AT APPROXIMATELY 1015L ON 17 APRIL . . . ABOUT SEVEN ARMED PEOPLE, WEARING BERETS (COLOR COULD NOT BE DETERMINED) AND PARTS OF MILITARY UNIFORMS WERE OBSERVED ATTACKING AN UNARMED PROBABLE MALE WHO DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ARMED. THE ARMED GANG, CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, SHOTGUNS AND STICKS, KICKED AND HIT THE UNARMED MALE WITH THE BUTT OF THEIR RIFLES. SCREAMS WERE CLEARLY HEARD AND THE ASSAULT LASTED ABOUT FIVE MINUTES . . . A MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MUP) POLICE PATROL CAME BY ABOUT 30 MINUTES AFTER THE LAST ATTACK, BUT THE TWO POLICE DID NOT GET OUT OF THEIR VEHICLE.

5. (U) AT ABOUT 0130L ON 18 APRIL . . THREE MORTAR AND/OR ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE OBSERVED IMPACTING JUST SOUTH OF THE AMERICAN CENTER. THE CONCUSSIVE FORCE OF THE EXPLOSIONS RATTLED THE WINDOWS . . . IT WAS CONFIRMED THE NEXT MORNING THAT THE B-H ASSEMBLY BUILDING WAS HIT BY THREE PROBABLE 120MM MORTAR ROUNDS, TWO ON THE ROOF AND ONE ON THE BACK WALL OF THE BUILDING.

6. (U) SMALLS ARMS FIRE AND MORTAR ROUNDS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT BUT SOUNDED MUCH FURTHER AWAY. ON RADIO SARAJEVO, THE MORNING OF 18 APRIL, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS THE QUIETEST IN B-H I N TEN DAYS.

8. (U) AFTER THE LAST FLIGHT OF THE DAY RO'S RETURNED TO THE AMERICAN CENTER AT APPROXIMATELY 1900L. . .ON THE WAY [VEHICLE WAS] STOPPED AT A ROADBLOCK CONSISTING OF THREE TRASH DUMPSTERS AND MANNED BY THREE "GREEN BERET" (FIELD COMMENT -- MUSLIM PARAMILITARY FORMATIONS IN B-H ARE CALLED GREENS BERETS. END COMMENT.) SOLDIERS ARMED WITH ONE M-59 SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLE AND TWO PROBABLY M-7 AUTOMATIC RIFLES. ALL THREE HAD WEAPONS TRAINED ON VEHICLE.

10. (U) THE NIGHT OF 18/19 APRIL WAS VERY QUIET IN THE AREA OF THE AMERICAN CENTER WITH ONLY SMALL ARMS FIRE HEARD IN THE DISTANCE.

11. (U) ON EASTER SUNDAY, 19 APRIL, AT 0820L, RO'S DROVE AROUND THE OLD CITY SECTION OF SARAJEVO. THIS AREA IS MORE THAN 90 PERCENT ETHNIC MUSLIM. RO'S WERE INFORMED BY "MUSLIM POLICE" THAT THE OLD CITY AND THE MAJORITY OF SARAJEVO PROPER WAS CONTROLLED BY MUSLIM AND CROAT POLICE.

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) Dispatches from Sarajevo, 20 April 1992.

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12. (U) RO'S DROVE TO THE SQUARE AND WERE STOPPED BY FIVE ARMED CIVILIANS, THE YOUNGEST OF WHICH WAS WEARING AN ALMOST NEW POLICE GREATCOAT WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT HIS. THE MEN ALL WORE GREEN BERETS . . .TWO WORE BULLET-PROOF VESTS. THEY TOLD RO'S ABOUT A RECENT SERBIAN MORTAR ATTACK ON THIS SQUARE WHICH KILLED FOUR CIVILIANS. THE GREEN BERETS WERE FRIENDLY, AND OFFERED RO'S SOME FRESH BREAD. THIS IS THE ONLY FOOD AVAILABLE TO THEM ACCORDING TO ALL PRESENT. THEY SHOWED RO'S THE EFFECTS OF THREE MORTARS WHICH DAMAGE[D] THREE HOUSES [AND] FOUR ROUNDS WHICH IMPACTED ON THE STREET . . . AND ANOTHER AREA, A CHILDREN'S HOME, WHERE THE GREEN BERETS CLAIMED THAT 40-50 ROUNDS FELL. . .RO'S WERE ALSO SHOWN 11 NEW GRAVES IN THE SQUARE OF THE PEOPLE FROM THIS NEIGHBORHOOD KILLED IN THE FIGHTING THUS FAR. THE CHIEF OF MUSLIM POLICE IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD STRESSED . . . SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE BRINGING FOOD TO B-H, BUT SHOULD BE BRINGING WEAPONS TO HELP THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE OF THIS NEW COUNTRY.

14. (U) ONE AMERICAN CENTER EMPLOYEE, A SERB, TOLD RO'S ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SARAJEVO. HE STATED THAT SERBS CONTROLLED THE HILLS SOUTH OF THE CITY AND THE HILLS NORTHWEST OF THE CITY. ASO THE NEIGHBORHOODS SOUTH OF ZAGREBACKA-MICE SOKOLOVICA-DOBROVOLJACKA STREETS WERE BLOCKADED AND CONTROLLED BY SERBS. . . THE EMPLOYEE CLAIMED THAT MUSLIMS CONTROL THE CITY CENTER AND THAT AT NIGHT ANYONE CAUGHT AFTER CURFEW WOULD BE "TAUGHT A LESSON AND TOLD NOT TO BREAK CURFEW AGAIN."

16. (U) ADDITIONALLY, THE CHIEF OF B-H PROTOCOL, ALSO TOLD THE U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE THAT THE B-H WANTED WEAPONS FROM THE U.S. MORE THAN THEY WANTED FOOD.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) FIELD COMMENTS. THE SITUATION IN SARAJEVO IS VERY TENSE, WITH ARMED GANGS PATROLING THE CITY AT NIGHT AND THE CITY SLOWLY BEING STARVED OUT. RO'S WERE CONTINUALLY TOLD THAT ONLY BREAD WAS READILY AVAILABLE, WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE CASE. AMERICAN CENTER EMPLOYEES DID APPROPRIA TE SOME HAM AND SALAMI FOR SANDWICHES ONE DAY AND FOUND FUEL TO VEHICLES WHICH THEY OFFERED TO RENT TO RO'S.

2. (U) SERBIAN FORCES OUTSIDE THE CITY HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO DESTROY RADIO-TELEVISION SARAJEVO AND ITS TV TRANSMISSION TOWER, OFTEN MISSING AND KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS. SERBIAN FORCES ARE ALSO PROBABLY STOPPING VIRTUAL ALL TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF SARAJEVO, THUS PREVENTING EVACUATION OF CITY RESIDENTS AND THE RESUPPLY OF SARAJEVO WITH FOOD.

3. (U) AS THIS SITUATION CONTINUES IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A MUSLIM-CROAT COALITION ARMY ATTEMPTS TO LIBERATE SARAJEVO AND DRIVE OUT THE SERBS AND THE JNA AROUND THE CAPITAL CITY. THIS LIBERATION MAY MAKE THE BATTLE FOR VUKOVAR PALE IN COMPARISON.

4. (U) UNFORTUNATELY, UNPROFOR FORCES AND CIVILIANS REMAINING IN SARAJEVO MAY BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE WITH NO EVACUATION ROUTES IN THE CENTER OF B-H.

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) Dispatches from Sarajevo, 20 April 1992.

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and on the night of 18 April, three mortar rounds impacted just south of the American Center in Sarajevo, where the staff were located. Movement within the city was obstructed by manned roadblocks, and armed gangs roamed freely at night. One individual personally witnessed two separate beatings on his first night in the city.

(U) Serbian forces were in the process of cutting off Sarajevo's contact with the outside world. Except for bread, food was in short supply, and the city, according to the report, was "slowly being starved out." Recognizing the disparity in military strength between Sarajevo residents and the besieging Serbian forces, representatives of the Bosnian government pleaded for weapons instead of humanitarian aid. The report warned that "as this situation continues, it is only a matter of time until a Muslim-Croat coalition army attempts to liberate Sarajevo and drive out the Serbs and the Yugoslav National Army around the capital city." Indeed, 2 days after this visit, fighting escalated to unprecedented levels. The siege of the city lasted nearly 4 years. During the siege, more than 9,500 men, women, and children died either from the fighting or from malnutrition and 55,000 were wounded.

(U) **Historical Significance.** This report demonstrates the unique military intelligence value of attaché reporting on the ground. At the time of the siege, the United States had no trained military intelligence personnel in Sarajevo and no U.S. defense attaché representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, the duties and responsibilities with respect to Sarajevo fell to the USDAO in Belgrade. While open-source reporting on the events was abundant, dispatches from the USDAO staff provided an eyewitness account and expert analysis from a defense intelligence perspective that could not be obtained elsewhere. Moreover, reports such as these served to underline the urgency of the crisis in the Balkans and helped spur the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force, consisting of DIA, CIA, NSA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials, in June 1992. The task force would ultimately play a huge role in U.S. decisionmaking regarding the Balkans. This report provides an excellent example of the unique and invaluable contributions of DIA's defense attachés. D

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(U) The Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2004

(U) **Background:** The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 ushered in a period of transformation for DIA as it reorganized to support military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, forward-deployed hundreds of analysts, and significantly expanded its counterterrorism mission. As DIA adapted to the new requirements of the post-9/11 world, the Agency continued to provide policymakers and warfighters with timely analysis of a broad range of issues relating to more traditional adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea. The threats and challenges of the new century, however, were not limited to those arising solely from the tumult of human affairs. During this same period, countries and regions across the globe suffered from a series of devastating natural disasters, including an earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (2004), a hurricane on the U.S. Gulf Coast (Katrina, 2005), a cyclone in Myanmar (2008), and destructive earthquakes in India (2001), Pakistan (2005), China (2008), and Haiti (2010).

(U) The Indian Ocean tsunami (26 December 2004) ranks as one of the worst natural disasters in recorded history, resulting in more than 230,000 deaths and devastating large areas of Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India. The toll included more than 125,000 injured, 45,752 missing, and about 1.69 million people displaced. The catastrophe prompted a massive response from the international community. On 28 December, the forward command element of Combined Support Force (CSF) 536 arrived in Thailand to begin coordinating military assistance to U.S. relief efforts as part of Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Charged with providing assistance to the governments of affected nations to minimize the loss of life and mitigate human suffering, the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, through CSF 536, conducted operations in support of other U.S. government agencies and in coordination with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and participating nations.

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) The tsunami devastated large areas of Indonesia, including Banda Aceh on the island of Sumatra. The Hospital Ship USNS MERCY can be seen in the background.

(U) **The DIA Effort.** DIA's Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC, designated the National Center for Medical Intelligence [NCMI] in 2008), played a central role in the Agency's response to the disaster, providing warfighters and policymakers with a full

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(U) Infectious Disease Alert

(DI-1812-722-04, 28 Dec 2004)

PACOM

(U) Asia: Health Impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami

(U) Date: December 2004

(U) Summary: A 26 December earthquake, reportedly the largest worldwide in the past 40 years, occurred off the coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia, causing tsunamis and widespread damage in multiple Southeast Asian countries. Hardest-hit areas are the southwestern coastal areas of Thailand, especially Phuket Island; Aceh Province in Sumatra, Indonesia; and coastal areas of eastern Sri Lanka and India. As of December 28, an estimated 40,000 people were reported dead and many thousands were missing. The total homeless population in the region is estimated in the millions.

(U) Several countries and international aid organizations have pledged aid and sent assessment teams and relief supplies. Concern exists about potential aftershocks or earthquakes, with resulting additional tidal waves and flooding.

(U) Assessment: A natural disaster of this magnitude and wide geographic area is unprecedented in modern times; the true extent of the damage in terms of lives, human health, and infrastructure likely will not be known for days or weeks. Damage to potable water supplies and delivery systems and consumption of water contaminated by bacterial or viral pathogens are the most immediate health concerns. Outbreaks of diarrhea and other waterborne diseases are likely among survivors, large numbers of whom will likely congregate in relief shelters or other areas without adequate clean water and sanitation. These diseases are likely to disproportionately affect the elderly and the very young.

(U) Bacterial and viral respiratory diseases likely will increase among people overcrowded in relief camps or shelters.

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Source: DoD Archive

(U) Extracts from "Asia: Health Impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami", 28 December 2004.

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spectrum of medical intelligence products. In the immediate aftermath of the event, AFMIC analysts produced updated assessments of infectious disease and environmental health risks in the disaster area and evaluated the status of medical infrastructure and disaster response capabilities in the region. AFMIC expanded its hours of operation to ensure responsiveness to the dynamic, complex, and evolving situation. The Center forward-deployed analysts to support PACOM where, with CONUS-based reachback support, they provided round-the-clock support to the Director for Intelligence (J2), Surgeon (J7), Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC), and the Joint Task Force / Combined Support Force (JTF/CSF)-536. AFMIC personnel also provided a predeployment briefing to a disaster relief team aboard the U.S. Navy hospital ship Mercy.

(U) AFMIC's Knowledge Management Team created SIPRNet and JWICS crisis pages to provide a centralized resource for medical intelligence products related to the disaster. The first product posted by AFMIC, (U) *Asia: Health Impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami* (28 December 2004), was soon followed by more than 100 additional assessments on topics ranging from the risks posed by the thousands of corpses left in the tsunami's wake, to the chemical hazards posed by damaged infrastructure, to the evaluation of potential bed down sites for deploying relief workers.

(U) **Historical Significance.** AFMIC's response to the 2004 tsunami in southeast Asia garnered high praise from a broad spectrum of DIA customers, to include the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the PACOM J2, the PACOM J7, U.S. Strategic Command, and first responders. It also serves to highlight the importance of relevant and timely all-source medical intelligence, a mission unique to DIA and one that helps protect military and civilian personnel deploying to inhospitable or potentially dangerous environments. Finally, it provides an excellent example of the organizational agility, responsiveness, and interagency coordination required to support military operations in a complex and unpredictable world that presents today's intelligence professionals with a challenging, diverse, and dynamic set of threats of both human and natural provenance. D

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